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ANGEL INVESTOR’S SELECTION CRITERIA: 
A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Abstract. Despite the important role of angel investors as critical financial providers for new 
ventures, little is known regarding how institutions make their investment decisions. While 
angels make decisions based on selection criteria during the first stage, they are also embedded 
within and affected by different institutional settings and as a result weight these criteria 
differently than other investors. We compare angel investors’ selection criteria in China and 
Denmark using the comparative institutional perspective. We use a policy capturing approach 
and hierarchy linear modeling, revealing that since Chinese angels are embedded within 
relationship-based institutional settings they tend to reply more on strong ties such as family 
and friends in management team, as well as weighting risks less compared to Danish angels 
operating within more rule-based institutional contexts. 
Key Words:  Institution-based view, angel investor, relationship-based institution, rule-based 
institution. 
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The difficulty of obtaining adequate external capital has been recognized as a major constraint 
on the formation and growth of new business ventures (Cassar, 2004). Angel investors, as 
private investors who give risk capital to the ventures in the early stages, provide critical 
financial as well as managerial support (Landström, 1995; Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 
2011). For example, 5% of the population in the United States is business angels, collectively 
investing $108 billion USD per year or 3.5 times the amount invested in start-ups by venture 
capital funds (Bygrave & Reynolds, 2004). While scholars have begun to recognize that 
different institutional contexts could influence venture capitalists’ (VCs) decision criteria 
(Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009; Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007), we have little 
idea how institutions play a role in affecting angel investors’ decisions to invest directly in 
small unquoted companies. 
While formal venture capitalists could rely on sophisticated due diligence and term sheet 
tools to build a solid investment portfolio (Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010), angel investors 
are more likely to depend on less formal procedures and personal relationships to select their 
projects and allocate investments (Duxbury, Haines, & Riding, 1996; Sudek, 2006). This 
makes angels more embedded in the local institution than venture capitalists, some of whom 
are pursuing global deals (Gu & Lu, 2010). Institutional contexts might therefore exert a higher 
impact on angel investor’ decisions than them on venture capitalists’ decision. This study 
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 2 
therefore aims to understand how angle investors’ decision-making differs in different 
institutional settings. 
 Economic history shows that institutions generate either productive or unproductive 
entrepreneurial activities (Baumol, 1996; North, 1990). Economic transactions are also 
affected by noneconomic factors such as social structure and network ties (Granovetter, 1985). 
Defined as “the rule of the game in a society” (North, 1990: 3), institutions serve as constraints 
that regulate economic activities, as well as instruct information distribution and the incentive 
structure (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Zacharakis et al., 2007). In this study we differentiate 
between two dominant institutional arrangements, rule-based and relationship-based 
institution, that profoundly affect exchanges, transactions, and entrepreneurial activities － 
including angel investments (Peng, 2003). Referring to Zacharakis et al. (2007)’s finding that 
VCs operating in rule-based institution weight more market factors than VCs operating in 
relationship-based institution, we developed our hypotheses and found that these institutional 
distinctions in different countries enable angel investors to have different attitudes toward new 
ventures’ characteristics. We focus on three key selection criteria: the source of the business 
plan, risk, uncertainty, and relationship with the start-up team members. These correspond to 
the three underlining decision factors: discovery of opportunities, evaluation, and monitoring. 
A theoretical framework for the angel investment decision model under different institutional 
settings is provided in Figure 1. Guided by the comparative institutional perspective, we 
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carefully compare the institutional arrangements in China and Denmark in order to find their 
distinctions and influences on angel investors’ decisions.  
[Figure 1] 
We focus on angel investors’ decisions at the selection stage. As the first stage in the 
investment decision process the selection stage has the highest rejection rate among all 
financing rounds that over 90% of the business proposals are rejected (Feeny, Haines, & Riding, 
1999; Riding, Madill, & Haines, 2007). Angel investors from different institutions share 
similar criteria in their selections, while differing in the way they weight these criteria because 
the presence or absence of certain institutional arrangements may increase or reduce 
perceptions of risk, transaction costs, and opportunistic behaviors (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & 
Chen, 2009).  
This study can make three significant theoretical contributions. First, to our best 
knowledge it is the first attempt to explore institutional differences in business angel decision 
criteria. Although previous studies conducted in varied countries have showed that angel 
investors in different countries have different behaviors, how the institutional system affects 
these difference has never been examined. A greater understanding of the rules of the game 
from a comparative institutional perspective will aid entrepreneurship researchers as well as 
would-be entrepreneurs, potential investors, and government policy makers attempting to 
revitalize their national economies.  
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Second, we provide entrepreneurs with insights into angel investors’ selection polices. 
Although there are a large number of potential investors and large amount of money, the ability 
of start-up ventures to attract funding has been extremely limited (Ring, Duxbury, & Haines, 
1997). Understanding the investment decision process might help identify the critical reason 
that causes an opportunity to be rejected and increase the investment success rate.  
Third, as many developing economies have undertaken fundamental transitions toward 
market-based economies since the 1980s, improved knowledge regarding individual behaviors 
and decision-making in these transition countries has become more important both for theory 
and practice. While the often-studied actors in transition economies are organizations (Peng, 
2003), individual actors affected by the fundamental institutional changes are less well-studied. 
While relationship-based institution transmits to rule-based institution, our model could further 
help entrepreneurs understand the dynamics and evolution of angel investors’ selection criteria.  
A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Entrepreneur and Angel Investor under Rule-Based and Relationship-Based Institutions 
Institutional theory suggests that entrepreneurs and investors will adapt to opportunity 
discoveries, evaluation and exploitation activities, incentive structures, and enforcement 
mechanisms within their institutional environments (Baker, Gedajlovic, & Lubatkin, 2005; 
Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009; Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & 
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Wright, 2010; North, 1990; Peng et al., 2009). The co-existence of two important institutional 
context types is widely recognized: rule-based and relationship-based institutions. Both have 
been found to have strong influences on venture capitalist’s decision-making policies and 
procedures (Bruton et al., 2009; Peng, 2003; Zacharakis et al., 2007). Rule-based institutions, 
which exist in most developed economies, usually refer to a well-codified legal infrastructure, 
commercial law, corporate law, and contract law with sophisticated property right and investor 
protections that dominate the impersonal exchange regime. Relationship-based institutions, 
which exist in most developing economies, refers to a weak legal system with limited property 
right and investor protections that govern both relationship-based and personalized 
transactions (North, 1990). While most developing economies are struggling to make their 
transition from relationship-based to rule-based institutions (Bruton et al., 2009; Peng & Zhou, 
2005; Peng, 2003), the founding institution still constrains this transition and 
relationship-based institutions still largely dominate (Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2012).   
Based on Scott (1995)’s classification, we map both entrepreneurs’ and investors’ 
responses in three dimensions: regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars, as shown in Table 1. 
In rule-based institutions the well-codified legal system and enforcing mechanisms reduce the 
transaction cost and uncertainty involved in building a cooperative, long-term, trusting 
exchange relationship, even with strangers. The well-specified investment contracts available 
in these institutions could protect investors’ equity and interest, reduce the domain and severity 
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of risk an investment is exposed to, and thereby encourage cooperation and trust between 
entrepreneurs and angel investors (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Investors could apply weak ties in 
order to explore more heterogeneous information and investment opportunities (Peng & Zhou, 
2005; Ma, Huang, & Shenkar, 2011). 
[Table 1] 
In contrast, in a weak legal system both entrepreneurs and angel investors face high 
transaction costs and uncertainty when developing a cooperative, long-term, trusting exchange 
relationship. They reduce these costs by cultivating intense and multiple ties or networks in 
order to create collective identities, avoid exchange hazards, and protect investment interests 
(Peng, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). In this 
relationship-based institutional context entrepreneurs and investors usually rely on established 
strong ties in order to exploit opportunities (Peng & Zhou, 2005; Ma et al., 2011). 
Angel Investor’s Selection Criteria 
As the most important source of financial capital to entrepreneurial firms, angel investments 
have been increasingly studied since Wetzel’s (1981, 1983) theoretical identification of its 
importance. The decision-making process is regarded as a key part of the angel investment 
procedure where investors judge the criteria of the new venture and make decisions (Feeney et 
al., 1999).  
Research suggests that the informal investment decision process can be divided into two 
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stages (Maxwell et al., 2011): 1) the selection stage where potential investors decide whether or 
not they are interested and will continue to consider the proposal, and  2) the post-selection 
stage where a more thorough assessment and potential negotiation will be conducted along 
with the final decision on whether or not to invest. We focus on the first stage where the 
investment criteria of the business proposal are evaluated and the rejection rate is the highest 
(Riding et al., 1997).  
Investment criteria have been studied frequently in the prior literature and a wide variety 
of possible factors have been listed that angel investors consider when making investment 
decisions (Bachher & Guild, 1996; Feeney et al., 1999; Haar, Starr, & MacMillan, 1988; 
Haines, Madill, & Riding, 2003; Landström, 1998; Sudek, 2006; Van Osnabrugge, 2000). 
Researchers investigating funding criteria note the importance of financial numbers and other 
easily verifiable factors such as sales, evidence of marketplace acceptance and size, as well as 
patent protection (e.g., Mason & Stark, 2004). In addition to these rather objective factors, 
more subjective factors are also found including personality characteristics, work ethic, 
business understanding, and realistic notion of the venture’s valuation (Feeney et al., 1999; 
Haines et al., 2003).  However, previous research on criteria identification, evaluation, and 
aggregation are often conducted separately in different countries, including the US (Bygrave & 
Reynolds, 2004), Canada (Duxbury et al., 1996), the United Kingdom (Short & Riding, 1989), 
Sweden (Landström, 1995), Australia (Hindle & Wenban, 1999), Asia (Tashiro, 1999; Hindle 
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 8 
& Lee, 2002), and so on. There are fewer attempts to understand how angel investors 
differently emphasize these criteria in different countries where varied institutional contexts 
may have an impact. 
Comparison of China and Denmark  
In this study we compare Chinese and Danish angel investors’ decision-making policies in 
order to identify the institutional influence while China and Denmark present as 
relationship-based and rule-based institutions respectively for these reasons. 1) Both counties 
have adapted civil law systems; however, the law system China adapted is influenced by the 
Soviet schema where the legislature retains the power to interpret statutes and the constitution 
remains ambiguous regarding judicial review of legislation. Law enforcement is very weak 
while corruption is notoriously rampant in practice (ranked number 76 in the corruption 
perception index, see Table 2a). China’s investor protection systems, corporate governance, 
and accounting standards are significantly less developed than those of most countries 
according to the World Bank Governance Index (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1997, 1998; Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005). Chinese society clearly demonstrates the 
attributes of relationship-based institutions (Zhou & Poppo, 2010). In contrast, Denmark has a 
long tradition of government openness, civic activism, and social trust with strong 
transparency and accountability mechanisms, ranking number 2 in the corruption perception 
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 9 
index. In Denmark intellectual property rights are well-protected and contracts are 
well-enforced, showing the attributes of a rule-based institution. 2) The freedom of market 
competition and government’s enforcement of such a system vary significantly between China 
and Denmark. The heritage foundation’s Economic Freedom Index describes the degree of 
private economic freedom mixed with a degree of government market regulation. While China 
is ranked number 138 in the 2012 Index, Denmark is ranked number 11 (see Table 2a). 3) The 
ease of starting up a business and investing in it is also different in China and Denmark. 
According to the World Bank Doing Business Report 2011 (see Table 2b), Denmark maintains 
its creditable 6th position on overall “Ease of Doing Business,” the highest-ranking country in 
the Europe. Meanwhile, China was ranked 79 out of 183 economies. Concerning investor 
protections Denmark was ranked 28 and China was ranked 98. These prominent differences 
between China and Denmark will accordingly provide us a good opportunity to differentiate 
between the effects of relationship- and rule-based institutions.  
[Table 2a and 2b] 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Under the institution comparative perspective we emphasize three criteria in investment 
opportunity discovery, evaluation, involvement, and monitoring.   
Discovering the Investment Opportunity 
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Prior research found that familiarity with the business field, personal knowledge of the 
entrepreneur, and a high regard for the third party who brought the investment proposal to the 
investors for review were highly related to the investment decision (Harrison, Dibben, & 
Mason, 1997). Usually third-party references can safeguard the exchange by reducing 
transaction costs and avoiding moral hazards (Williamson, 1979). A reference with a high 
reputation can give the investor confidence in the proposal’s quality and entrepreneurial 
personality (Bian, 1997). In rule-based institutions individuals are embedded within an 
environment with a well-established legal system, higher social trust, and reliable government 
and market machinery; these are the root of trust in information from unfamiliar parties. Angel 
investors in this institutional context can therefore discover potential investment projects via 
weak tie referent parties. Untrustworthy behavior could be punished by social sanctions, 
helping induce cooperation (Hagen & Choe, 1998). Although weak ties lack the effective 
content of infrequent interaction, they have advantages in carrying novel information and 
facilitating investment opportunities by providing nonredundant information embedded within 
separated network (Granovetter, 1973; Ma et al., 2011).    
However, in a relationship-based institution most important exchanges are made through 
existing strong ties built via frequent interactions and reciprocal favors (Granovetter, 1973; 
Peng & Zhou, 2005; Ma et al., 2011). These strong ties always control critical information that 
is not shared with others who do not have these ties or trust (Bian, 1997). The frequent 
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interactions and reciprocal favors combined with risk-taking and successful fulfillment of 
previous exchanges strengthen the motivation of individuals to rely on close relationships and 
invest acquired resources into the next exchange with a known partner (Peng & Zhou, 2005). In 
a relationship-based institution such as China angel investors accordingly count on the 
reliability and dependability of previous interactions with the referent party in order to screen 
proposals over the credibility of strangers. Since angel investors tend to make a less thorough 
evaluation of potential investments but quicker investment decisions than venture capitalists 
(Mason & Harrison, 1996), if a strong tie such as a close friend brings the opportunity a 
Chinese angel investor weight it more heavily than a Danish investor.  
H1: Chinese angel investors more strongly emphasize an opportunity brought by a friend 
compared to a cold call in selecting investment opportunities than Danish investors do. 
 
Evaluating the Investment Opportunity 
Unlike venture capitalists who have a portfolio of investments to balance successful and failed 
investments (Cumming, 2006), angel investors tend more to carefully evaluate the rates of 
return and will have a systematically superior investment performance than VCs (Mason & 
Harrison, 2002; Riding, 2008). At the macro level China’s dynamic economy with its low 
starting point and high speed could provide more business opportunities than Denmark’s more 
developed economy with slow development (see the comparison in Table 2a). In addition, 
China’s low income level and standard of living could drive Chinese investors who seek large 
returns more strongly than Danish investors. Based on our comparative institutional 
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perspective, we also argue that the transactions costs in a relationship-based institutional 
setting are higher than those in rule-based institutions. For example, China lacks the high level 
of legal enforceability that facilitates the application of contracts safeguarding market 
exchanges characterized by non-trivial hazards. Accordingly, Chinese investors rely on 
“relational reliability” (e.g., the trust in strong ties) to protect transactions associated with 
specialized assets and behavioral uncertainty (Zhou & Poppo, 2010). In contrast, Danish 
investors could emphasize returns less strongly against the low level of transaction costs in a 
rule-based context. 
At the micro level we must note the “sunk costs” of strong ties in relationship-based 
institutions (Northcraft & Wolf, 1984). Strong ties take time and effort to build, and have high 
costs that cannot be recovered (Peng & Zhou, 2005). The scale and scope of strong ties are 
often constrained with limited size. When either entrepreneurs or investors want to expand the 
scale or scope of a transaction the cost of strong ties will be multiplied in an extended network 
(Peng, 2003). However, based on the weak ties connecting opportunities Danish investors may 
be less concerned with sunk transaction costs. Considering the costs incurred prior to the 
particular investment opportunity we suggest:   
H2a: Chinese angel investors more strongly emphasize returns in selecting investment 
opportunities than Danish angel investors do.  
 
For angel investors risk could better be defined in terms of the amount potentially lost than 
in terms of variance in the outcome distribution because most do not allocate investments into a 
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managed portfolio the way venture capitalists do (March & Shapira, 1987). The rapid political, 
economic, and social changes occurring in a harsh transition economy such as China could 
increase start-ups’ discontinuation rates at the high level of 10.28% in 2007 and 5.3% in 2011, 
compared with a stable economy such as Denmark at 1.55% in 2007 and 2.3% in 2011 (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), 2007, 2011). At the macro level, by operating within a 
highly dynamic and hostile environment with weak investor protections Chinese angel 
investors could expect to lose significantly more in some projects, and accordingly bear greater 
risks than Danish investors operating within a mature economy with strong minority investor 
right protections. 
At the micro level, in a relationship-based institution both entrepreneurs and investors in 
China could frequently protect trust among strong ties by building relational reliability in order 
to reduce the liability under a weak legal environment (Zhou & Poppo, 2010). They could 
respond to business failures by bestowing even greater trust or investments, namely called 
“throwing good money after bad” (Guler, 2007). A lengthy and inefficient bankruptcy 
environment could multiply this ironic effect of trust (Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007). In contrast, 
a Danish investor who relies more on weak ties in opportunity evaluation is less likely to fall 
into such potentially self-defeating trap and is more to explore alternative options (Shapiro, 
1987).  
However, strong ties also carry the advantage of the “cushion” effect. In-group members 
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such as family always step in to help out group members who confront a large and possibly 
catastrophic loss after choosing a risky option in a relationship-based context such as China 
(Weber & Hsee, 1998). A Chinese investor could therefore tolerate a greater investment loss 
than a Danish investor because the Chinese investor has built-in backup. Thus, we have: 
H2b: Chinese angel investors less emphasis on risk in selecting investment opportunities 
than Danish angel investors do. 
 
Involvement and Monitoring 
In addition to their financial role in new venture development, angel investors also play a 
substantial role in the strategy-making and daily operations of these ventures (Wiltbank, Read, 
Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009). An angel investor could gain ex post control and exert power over 
the investment in a high-risk small-firm environment via active involvement after investment 
(Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Under the comparative institutional perspective, in a 
relationship-based institution where intellectual property rights are less protected and  there is a 
friend or family member on the start-up team angel investors can more easily become accepted 
by the team and become involved in the business with entrepreneurs’ cooperation. However, in 
rule-based institutions even without these bridging ties an entrepreneur team can build trust 
relationships with an angel investor because people in latter institution believe that most people 
can be trust (Ma et al., 2011).  
Monitoring ventures following investment is another consideration for angel investors. In 
a relationship-based institution the monitoring roles of the board of directors and minority 
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shareholders are weak. Angel investors have tremendous difficulties protecting their interests 
through formal channels such as board or shareholder meetings; instead they rely on strong ties 
with the funded firm, government, or judicial system to further aid in the monitoring process 
and legal issues (Howson & Clarke, 2011). It is not uncommon that a Chinese investor cannot 
access the funded firm’s accounting report (Ahlstrom, Bruton, &Yeh, 2007). A strong 
connection such as a family member or friend on the entrepreneurial team can therefore serve 
as a springboard for monitoring assistance since the family or friend would pay the penalty of 
losing trust (or “face”) if he or she violated the investor’s rights or did not disclosure critical 
insider information to the investor (Peng & Zhou, 2005). In contrast, in a rule-based institution 
the entrepreneurial team maintains their fiduciary duties to investors even without personal 
connections. The strong protection of minority investor rights and corporate governance also 
allows angel investor to formulate an optimal contract with contingency incentive plans in 
order to overcome any moral hazard or adverse selection issues (Van Osnabrugge, 2000). A 
Danish investor can therefore trust stranger when investing. We suggest that: 
H3a: Chinese angel investors more strongly emphasize the venture’s entrepreneurial team 
when it includes a friend as a member than Danish angel investors do.   
 
H3b: Chinese angel investors more strongly emphasize the venture’s entrepreneurial team 
when it includes a family member than Danish angel investors do. 
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METHODS 
Angel investment decisions have been studied using different methodologies including 
questionnaires, verbal protocols, interviews, etc. (Duxbury et al., 1996; Maxwell et al., 2011; 
Prowse, 1998). We used the policy capturing approach from the social judgment theory (Slovic 
& Lichtenstein, 1971) in order to uncover how these assessment factors or criteria are used in 
human decision-making (e.g., Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004; Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Lovallo, Clarke, & Camerer, 2012; Zacharakis et al., 2007). 
Differing from surveys and interviews in prior studies, this method avoids relying on investors’ 
often biased retrospections and instead allows researchers to observe directly entrepreneurial 
decisions (Davidson, 2007; Lovallo et al., 2012). We adapted this method for angel investment 
decision; it has not been used in this domain so far as we know.  
Sample 
MBA students from two large universities in China (N= 60) and Denmark (N = 53) who 
finished courses related to either entrepreneurship or venture financing took part in this 
programs. As stated in their career statements and curriculum vista available in MBA resume 
booklets they had prepared and evaluated business plans, and some were in the process of 
conceiving entrepreneurships or investing in private companies. The two groups are not 
significantly different in demographics such as gender (γ = -.057, p = .682) and age (γ = -.209, 
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p = .130). The respondents read the instructions asking them to play the role of angel investors 
and examine a summary prepared by the assistant. Each respondent examined eight investment 
scenarios and indicated their interest in looking further into the projects. Respondents varied in 
their investment scenarios as described above. 
Variables 
Following Hitt et al. (2000, 2004), we collected the criteria for angel investments from the 
literature (as discussed above), itemized them, and scanned the final list with local angel 
investors. The detailed description can be found in Table 3.  The eight investment criteria in 
each scenario act as independent variables and control variables at level-1 (the scenario level). 
They cover a broad range of new venture characteristics including source of the business plan, 
investment return, risk of failure, relationship with members of the start-up team, compatibility 
with investors’ expertise and interests, start-up team capabilities, opportunity to become 
involved in the new venture, and exit plan (Feeney et al., 1999; Landström, 1995; Mason & 
Stark, 2004; Maxwell et al., 2011). We provided a brief description of each criterion in the front 
page of the questionnaire in order to help respondents’ understanding.  
We then constructed investment project scenarios by randomly assigning (using a random 
number generator) the levels of the investment criteria in each case in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. We examined the correlations of the independent variables in order to ensure 
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the randomization. We also ensured that the variance of each variable was balanced in the 
construction of the scenarios so that each variable had a relatively equal probability of having 
an effect on the dependent variable.  
Dependent variable. The selection tendency to invest is the dependent variable of the 
study. It was measured by the average of two items, “Is this company attractive for you to 
invest?” with a five-Likert scale from 1= very unattractive to 5= very attractive, and “What is 
the probability that you would invest in this start-up business?” with a five-Likert scale from 
1= low probability to 5= high probability. Individuals’ answers to these two questions were 
highly correlated (γ = .868, p < .000). The two groups, Chinese and Danes, were not 
significantly different in selection tendency (t-value = .983, p = .326). 
Independent variables. For the source of business plan, we use the dummy for 1 (friend) 
and 0 (cold call ) as our independent variables. Using dummies for comparing different 
categories  is often adapted in research using policy capturing method (Boatsman & Robertson, 
1974; York, 1989). For the investment return, we use three scale from 1(low return) to 3 (high 
return). For risk of failure, we use three scale from  1 (possibly huge loss) to 3 (possibly little 
loss). For relationship with members of the start-up team, we use two dummies: friend (1) and 
stranger (0), and family (1) and stranger (0). 
[Table 3] 
Control Variable. At level-1, all the other scenario characteristics act as the control 
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variables (as show in Table 3). At level-2 (the individual level) we controlled the basic 
demographic variables including age, gender, and income (Maula, Autio, & Arenius, 2005; 
Szerb, Rappai, Makra, & Terjesen, 2007). We also controlled the individual experiences 
relating to informal investment: previous informal investment was measured using the question 
“Whether you have being an angel investor before?”; previous finance investment was 
measured using the question “Do you have experience in financial investment, such as stocks, 
real estates, foreign exchange, bonds?”; entrepreneurial experience was measured using the 
question “Do you have startup experience?” (Maula et al., 2005; Wiltbank et al., 2009).  
RESULTS 
China and Denmark Comparison 
We used a multilevel model in our study where investment criteria and investors’ decisions 
were at level-1 and individual characteristics were at level-2. Since each individual reviewed 
eight scenarios, there are 480 observations for Chinese sample and 424 observations for Danish 
sample. For the scenarios embedded in each respondent we used Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM) to analyze the data (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hitt et al., 2000, 2004), control 
within-respondent variance (i.e., eight cases per respondent), and assesses between-respondent 
variance (i.e., between respondents within each country) and group effects with coefficients 
that can be interpreted similar to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis (Bryk & 
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Raudenbush, 1992). All explanatory variables were centered on their grand mean when entered 
into the model. The descriptive statistics and correlations for the level-1 and level-2 variables 
are shown in Table 4. 
[Table 4] 
We first developed separate models for the Chinese and Danish samples using hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM). From the separate results for China and Denmark, we can see that all 
eight criteria in level-1 have very significant effects on investment propensity for Chinese 
investors. For Danish investors, the relationship with the entrepreneurial team does not 
significantly influence the selection tendency toward investment. This may reveal that Danish 
investors are less influenced by a relationship-based institutional context as Chinese investors.  
We build Models 3 to 5 in Table 5 to analyze the data including both the China and 
Denmark sample, adding the country dummy. In Model 3 we set the criteria at level-1 and find 
substantial between-individual differences that have significant coefficients for all eight 
scenarios. In Model 2 we add the level-2 control variables, and in Model 3 we add the country 
moderation and perceived financial institution into the model. Hypothesis 1 indicates that 
Chinese investors favor a business plan received from a friend compared to cold call more than 
Danish investors. However, results fail to find significant difference for Chinese and Danish 
investors (γ = .175, p = .119), although the coefficient is positive. For the return criterion, the 
results does not fully support H2a that Chinese investors more heavily emphasize this criterion 
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than Danish investors (γ = .024, p = 0.755), however, the coefficient is positive. For hypothesis 
2b, results in Model 6 suggest that Chinese investors less emphasis on risk in selecting 
investment opportunities than Danish angel do (γ = -.234, p < .05). H2b therefore receives 
support. Finally, for the relationship between the entrepreneurial team and investors (H3ab), 
Chinese investors more heavily emphasize family (γ  = .233, p < 0.1) and friends (γ  = .368, p < 
0.05) over strangers than Danish investors. Both H3a and H3b accordingly receive supports.  
Following Hitt et al.(2000, 2004), we also have a robustness check through comparing the 
weight each criterion received from Chinese and Danish investors respectively. We test 
hypotheses through separating models for China (Model 4) and Denmark (Model 5). The 
coefficients obtained in these separate samples are compared using a z-test, the technique 
summarized by Cohen and Chohen (1983: 111) and commonly applied in criterion 
comparisons (Hitt et al. 2000, 2004). The results confirmed that Chinese investors put less 
weight in risk (z = -1.62, p < 0. 05), while put more weight on the relationship with team 
members, who are friend (z = 1.64, p < 0. 05) and family (z = 2.85, p < 0. 01) compare to 
stranger. Z-score on Source-friend between Chinese and Danish investor is high, but not reach 
significant level. Therefore, z-test confirms that H2b, H3a, and H3c get strong supports, but H1 
and H1a not. 
[Table 5] 
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DISCUSSION 
Under a comparative institutional perspective we examined how institutional context 
influences angel investors’ business project selection. One important finding is that institutions 
have significant impact on angel investor decision-making. Compared to Danish investors, 
Chinese angel investors would weight their relationships with start-up teams higher than 
Danish investors that they tend to invest in new ventures that have family members or friends 
on the entrepreneurial team, while Danish investors give more equal treatment to family 
members, friends, and strangers. These findings are supported by previous survey in GEM, 
although GEM has not identified the significance of differences. The aggregated GEM 2007 
adult population survey at the national level found that only 4.6% of Chinese angel investors 
would invest in a stranger, while 42% would invest in family and 47.6% would invest in a 
friend. Meanwhile, in Denmark, 17.1% would invest in a stranger, 36.3% in family, and 27.4% 
in a friend. Our results also shows that both Chinese and Danish investors tend to invest in 
opportunity with lower risk, while Chinese investors tend to weigh the risk less. These findings 
highlight the importance of the selection criteria differences between China and Denmark. 
However, do all these differences arise from the variances between relationship-based 
institution and rule-based institutions? 
A challenging explanation comes from the culture dimension. Although the GLOBE 
culture survey has not identified the significant difference between China and Denmark (see 
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Table 2a for details), Hofstede’s (1991) culture dimension reveals that Chinese and Danish 
investors are sharply different in the Individualism-Collectivism dimension. The score for 
China was 20 (high collectivism) and for Denmark 74 (low collectivism) in the survey taken 
nearly 40 years ago. However, some scholars have recently argued that China values a strong 
inner self under Confucian traditional culture and could represent a more radical individualism 
than the Western one (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). Others argue that a collectivism culture could 
move to individualism as a consequence of economic growth and modernization (Hamamura, 
2012). In addition, our result on H1 indicates that Chinese angle investors not more heavily 
rely on strong ties to seek investment opportunities than Denmark investors. Chinese investors 
may explore widely to discover qualified business plan. We therefore do not adopt this 
alternative perspective, although previous research shows that collectivism could partially 
explain the importance of strong ties in opportunity recognition within relationship-based 
institutions (Ma et al., 2011).   
This study makes contributions to the literature from several aspects. First, for theoretical 
contribution, we develop a theoretical comparative institutional perspective explaining why 
angel investors have different selection criteria under different institutional environments. We 
underscore the importance of whether the institutional context is relationship-based or 
rule-based in order to better understand entrepreneurial activities; “[t]ransactions of all kinds” 
at all levels of the firm or individual “are rife with . . . social connections” that have different 
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institution support (Granovetter, 1985: 495-499). These different connections or ties could 
facilitate different trust levels via norms of reciprocity and successful cooperation in networks. 
They accordingly play a crucial and underappreciated role in fostering investments and 
entrepreneurial prosperity (Fukuyama, 1995).  
Second, we enrich the research on angel investors’ investment decision-making polices. 
Our findings may help reconcile the discovery of previous research conducted in different 
countries that angel investors’ behavior is slightly different in different countries and 
institutional contexts. This study suggests that findings from numerous single-country studies 
must be qualified with an explicit comparisons and discussion concerning the enabling and 
constraining forces of the institutional framework. We also show that national institutions can 
be conceptualized in a way that captures the critical variations across countries that then can be 
used to explain individual behavior under different contexts.  
Third, for methodology contribution, the use of policy capturing and HLM model enable 
us to empirically uncover the investor’s emphasis on information while making informal 
investment decisions. Different from prior research conducted in a single-country setting, we 
examine at a larger picture and contrast China and Denmark as two distinct institutional 
settings. We conduct a between-countries comparison in order to explore the institutional 
contexts of informal investment. Perhaps the strongest message of our study is that given the 
same decision-making criteria, we must consider the context the individual investors are 
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embedded within. At the individual level the political and market pressures faced by angel 
investors might also be faced by other economic actors such as top executives and 
entrepreneurs. The individuals making decisions are accordingly influenced by existing 
institutional realities. HLM model can help us to identify these influences at different levels. 
Lastly, for practical contribution, our findings can help policymakers promote a good 
entrepreneurship policy. We reveal the shortfalls of relationship-based institution in 
constraining the scale and scope of these ties. The weak legal protections and contract 
enforcement could make entrepreneurs and investors over-embedded in strong tie relationships, 
especially in start-up team. Policymakers might propose measures that help transform 
rule-based institution in extending the scale and scope of angel investors’ support.  Moreover, 
our finding can help entrepreneurs understand investors’ selection criteria. According to many 
studies of private investment the rejection rates for investment proposals are high (Mason & 
Harrison, 1995). High rejection rates prompt the need to better understand both the processes 
and criteria that angel investors use to make their decisions. This study seeks to add the 
explanations to investors’ selection criteria.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This study has some limitations that clearly encourage further research. First, we have not 
directly measured either the tie strength or intensity in the relationship between entrepreneurs 
and investors in our policy capturing approach. Future research should examine the role of 
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strong versus weak ties in angel investors’ decision-making policies along with the 
contribution of these ties to new venture performance.  Collectively, such research can offer a 
detailed account of social relationships' effects on new venture investments. 
Second, this study is the first to show the different investor selection criteria between 
China and Denmark. However, do the differences between relationship-based and rule-based 
institutions sufficiently explain this variance? Future research may include additional emerging 
economies such as Asian and Latin American countries as well as developed economies in the 
sample. After controlling for additional cultural variances, a replication of this study with other 
countries could address any generalizability concerns stemming from using a sample surveying 
only two countries.  
Third, we have not identified the selection criteria applied by angel investors that are 
different from those of formal venture capitalists. The literature already shows different 
investment criteria between angel investors and venture capitalists (Feeney et al., 1999; Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000; Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003). However, little research has 
weighted these institutional influences on the different criteria applied by these two kinds of 
important investors. This study highlights the importance of a comparative institutional 
perspective on angel investor selection criteria, but remains to be done in order to fully 
understand the complexities of investors’ decision-making in new ventures.   
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Figure 1 Angel Investor Selection Criteria under an Institutional Comparative 
Perspective 
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Table 1 Comparison of Rule-Based and Relationship-Based Institutions 
 
 Institution Relationship-Based Institution Rule-Based Institution 
R
eg
u
la
ti
v
e 
P
il
la
r 
 
Characteristics  Lack of a good legal system with enough property rights and investor 
protection. 
 Personalized network-based transactions. 
 Enforcing contracts: out-of-court settlement, informal process, relying on 
personal trust, informal agreements, and social tie pressure from trading 
partner or community.  
 Capital market: immature and limited access.  
 Bankruptcy: a lengthy and inefficient, time-consuming process, firm 
operations may or may not cease depending on negotiations, difficult for 
entrepreneur to exit from debt claims. 
 Competition: limited access. 
 
 A well-codified legal infrastructure such as commercial law, corporate 
law, and contract law with sophisticated property right and investor 
protections. 
 Impersonal arm’s length transactions.  
 Enforcing contracts: formal process, relying on effective third-parties 
such as courts and lawyers.  
 Capital market: mature, large force in firm valuation, financing, and 
investment exit.  
 Bankruptcy: bankrupt entrepreneurs exit the firm and creditors claim 
firm assets through court intervention. Firm operations cease (Lee et al., 
2007). 
 Competition: open access (North, Wallis, &Weingast, 2009), 
encouraging new entries and stimulating surviving firms to become 
more efficient. 
Entrepreneur’s 
Response 
 Build loosely structured entrepreneurial networks to compensate for lack 
of formal institutional protection (Xin & Pearce, 1996). 
 Access critical resources with informal collaboration under informal 
institutions (Webb et al., 2009). 
 Interact with strangers to start and develop businesses. 
 Access rich resources with formal institution’s support. 
Angel Investor’s 
responses 
 Rely on strong ties: provide trust and predictability but consume time and 
effect to build (Peng & Zhou, 2005). 
 Rely on weak ties: more heterogeneous information and investment 
opportunities (Peng & Zhou, 2005). 
N
o
rm
at
iv
e 
P
il
la
r 
Characteristics  Rules are opaque and ambiguous. 
 Public-private boundaries is blurred (Peng, 2001). 
 Grey and informal (even renegade) economy (Webb et al., 2009). 
 Pervasive adoption of family business groups and crony capitalism in 
Asia (Carney, Gedajlovic, &Yang, 2009). 
 Concentrating economic power under powerful families in Latin America 
(Bruton et al., 2009). 
 Rules are stable and transparent.  
 Government and business have clear lines. 
 Trust strangers and outsiders. 
 
Entrepreneur’s 
Responses 
 Cultivate two sets of networks: 1/ suppliers, buyers, and alliances; 
2/rent-seeking government officials due to harassment from the 
government (Peng, 2001).  
 Discover, evaluate and exploit opportunity through strong ties (Ma et al., 
2011). 
 Relationships with ties located in distant cities are harder to manage than 
local ties (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002). 
 Explore and create new market with new technology. 
 Discover, evaluate. and exploit opportunity through weak ties (Ma et al., 
2011). 
Angel Investor’s 
Responses 
 Cultivate strong ties which have good relationship to exploit investment 
opportunities such as linking to powerful families within the region 
(Bruton et al., 2009; Peng & Zhou, 2005).   
 Establishing diversified weak ties to explore investment opportunities. 
 Heavily rely on references to entrepreneur’s personality. 
C o g n i t i v e  P i l l a r s Characteristics   Broadly held personal beliefs regarding responsibility.  Beliefs and values centered on market competition. 
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 Cushion effect: mutual help and support among in-group members.  
Entrepreneur’s 
Responses 
 Partner with strong ties to avoid adverse selection. Could be  
overembedded in family and social ties (Ahlstrom et al., 2007). Lost 
“face” if violating the investor’s rights. 
 Bribing is justifiable (Djankov, Qian, Roland, & Zhuravskaya, 2006). 
 A group’s collective identity enhance the opportunity recognition (Webb 
et al., 2009). 
 Strong attitude that the firm is theirs, and the investor should not interfere 
(Bruton et al., 2009). 
 Focus competition based on market-based capabilities. 
 Keeps fiduciary duty to investor. 
Angel Investor’s 
Responses 
 Investment criteria emphasize human capital factors (leadership, market 
familiarity, and start-up experiences) (Zacharakis et al., 2007). 
 Investment criteria more emphasize market factors (market size, market 
growth, propriety technology, number of competitor, and competitor 
strength) (Zacharakis et al., 2007). 
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Table 2a China and Denmark Comparison from Other Data Sources 
 
Items China/Chinese Denmark/Danish Source 
Area  9,596,961 sq km 43,094 sq km CIA Database 
Ethnic Groups Han 91.5% (other 55 minor) 7  CIA Database 
Population 2011 1,336,718,015 (rank 1) 5,529,888 (rank 111) CIA Database 
Administrative Divisions 32 Provinces/Autonomous 
Regions/Municipalities 
5 regions CIA Database 
GDP (purchasing power parity) 
2011 
$11300 Billion (rank 3) $208.8 billion (rank 
54) 
CIA Database 
GDP Growth 2011 9.5% (rank 6) 1.5% (rank 177) CIA Database 
Commercial Bank Prime Lending 
Rate 
6.6% (rank 157) 4.5% (rank 170) CIA Database 
Economic Freedom Rank 2012 138 11 Heritage Foundation 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 3.6 (No. 76) 9.4 (No.2) Transparency 
International 
Early-Stage Entrepreneurship 
Activities (TEA: percentage of 
adults) 
24.0% 4.6% GEM 2011 
Angel Investor Prevalence Rate 9.41% 2.05% GEM 2007 
Discontinuation of Business 5.3% 2.3% GEM 2011 
Fear of Failure 35.6% 40.5 GEM 2011 
Corporate Governance -0.52 1.84 World Bank 
Governance Index  
Social Trust 55.3% 58.3% World Value Survey 
Divorce/Marriage Ratio 22.03% 42.25% World Bank 
Public Social Security Expenditure 5.97% 27.1% La Porta, et al., 1997 
Highest Rates of 
Personal Income Tax 2010 
45% 55.4% KPMG 
Materialist 23.5% 3.6% World Value Survey/ 
Inglehart’s Indicators 
Postmaterialist 0.3% 7.2% World Value Survey/ 
Inglehart’s Indicators 
Culture    
Performance Orientation (practice) 4.45 4.22 GLOBE 
Performance Orientation (value) 5.67 5.61 GLOBE 
Uncertainty Avoidance (practice) 4.94 5.22 GLOBE 
Uncertainty Avoidance (value) 5.28 3.82 GLOBE 
Humane Orientation (practice) 4.36 4.44 GLOBE 
Humane Orientation (value) 5.32 5.45 GLOBE 
Institutional Collectivism 
(practice) 
4.56 4.19 GLOBE 
Institutional Collectivism (value) 4.77 4.8 GLOBE 
Ingroup Collectivism (practice) 5.8 3.53 GLOBE 
Ingroup Collectivism (value) 5.09 5.5 GLOBE 
Assertiveness (practice) 3.76 3.8 GLOBE 
Assertiveness (value) 5.44 3.39 GLOBE 
Power Distance (practice) 5.04 3.89 GLOBE 
Power Distance (value) 3.1 2.76 GLOBE 
Future Orientation (practice) 3.75 4.44 GLOBE 
Future Orientation (value) 4.73 4.33 GLOBE 
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Table 2b Comparison of China and Denmark: World Bank Doing Business Report 
2011 
 
Rankings China Denmark Indicator Detail China Denmark 
Ease of Doing 
Business 
79 6    
Acquiring Credit 65 15 Strength of Legal Rights Index (0-10) 6 9 
Depth of Credit Information Index (0-6) 4 4 
Public Registry Coverage (% of adults) 63.9 0.0 
Private Bureau Coverage (% of adults) 0.0 5.4 
Protecting Investors 93 28 Extent of Disclosure Index (0-10) 10 7 
Extent of Director Liability Index (0-10) 1 5 
Ease of Shareholder Suits Index (0-10) 4 7 
Strength of Investor Protection Index 
(0-10) 
5.0 6.3 
Trading Across Borders 50 5 Documents to Export (number) 7 4 
Time to Export (days) 21 5 
Cost to Export (US$ per container) 500 744 
Documents to Import (number) 5 3 
Time to import (days) 24 5 
Cost to import (US$ per container) 545 744 
Closing a Business 68 5 Recovery Rate (cents on the dollar) 36.4 89.4 
Time (years) 1.7 1.1 
Cost (% of estate) 22 4 
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Table 3 Selection Criteria of Angel Investor 
 
Variables Description 
Main Variables  
Source of Business Plan (H1) 1. Cold call by the startup team; 2.personal friends; 3. 
professional market intermediary. 
Investment Return (H2a) Scale ranging from 1(low return) to 3 (high return). 
Risk of Failure (H2b) Scale ranging from 1 (possibly huge loss) to 3 (possibly 
little loss).  
Relationship between Investor and Members 
of Start-up Team (H3a&b) 
1. Strangers; 2.friends; 3.family. 
Control Variables  
Compatibility with Investor Expertise and 
Interest 
Scale ranging from 1 (low compatibility) to 3 (high 
compatibility). 
Start-up Team Capabilities and Track Record Scale ranging from 1 (no good) to 3 (very good). 
Opportunity for Involvement in New Venture Scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 3 (likely). 
Exit Plan 1. No exit plan; 2.exit plan exists.  
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Level-1 and Level-2 Variables 
 
 
 
a
 n1 =904;  
b 
n2 =113. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Relation-Friend  0.50 0.500           
2.Relation-Family  0.26 0.441 -0.592          
3.Return  2.00 0.706 -0.046 0.037         
4.Risk 2.03 0.704 0.010 -0.023 -0.029        
5.Source- Professional 0.50 0.500 0.017 -0.020 -0.043 0.000       
6.Source- Friend  0.24 0.426 -0.018 0.037 0.038 -0.067 -0.559      
7.Compatibility 2.03 0.688 0.004 0.029 0.016 0.007 0.035 0.048     
8.Team Capability 1.95 0.699 -0.032 0.022 -0.005 0.007 -0.047 -0.019 0.012    
9.Involvement  2.05 0.713 -0.011 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.023 -0.019 0.035 -0.010   
10.Exit 0.66 0.633 -0.020 0.073 -0.049 -0.035 0.040 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.034  
11.Investment tendency 2.86 1.096 0.035 0.070 0.241 0.344 0.074 0.014 0.208 0.261 0.115 0.099 
             
Level-2 Variables b Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6     
1.Age 2.32 0.485           
2.Gender 1.06 0.612 -0.261          
3.Income 2.03 1.096 0.489 -0.269         
4.Education 4.51 0.565 -0.071 -0.111 0.122        
5.Informal Investment 0.04 0.201 -0.137 -0.020 -0.006 0.108       
6.Finance Investment 0.67 0.473 0.281 -0.367 0.431 0.387 0.147      
7.Start-up Experience 0.27 0.618 0.359 -0.290 0.402 -0.005 0.387 0.152     
             
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 38 
 
Table 5 China and Denmark Comparison-HLM Regression 
 
 
The number in parenthesis is the standard error. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 Full Sample (China and Denmark) China Denmark  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 z (Difference 
Tests) 
Level -1 
Independent Variable 
      
Source- Friend  0.308 (0.091)*** 0.308 (0.091)*** 0.357 (0.086)*** 0.408 (0.113)*** 0.216 (0.119)+ 1.1 
Return  0.590 (0.041)*** 0.591 (0.041)*** 0.592 (0.039)*** 0.601 (0.056)*** 0.582 (0.058)*** 0.15 
Risk  0.411 (0.049)*** 0.411 (0.049)*** 0.414 (0.046)*** 0.291 (0.063)*** 0.547 (0.059)*** -1.62* 
Relation-Friend  0.263 (0.077)*** 0.264 (0.077)*** 0.264 (0.071)*** 0.430 (0.106)*** 0.141 (0.101) 1.64* 
Relation-Family  0.304 (0.085)*** 0.304 (0.086)*** 0.271(0.083)** 0.549 (0.114)*** 0.064 (0.114) 2.85** 
 
Control Variables 
       
Source- Professional 0.352 (0.081)*** 0.353 (0.081)*** 0.382 (0.076)*** 0.436 (0.116)*** 0.233 (0.104)*  
Compatibility 0.298 (0.044)*** 0.301 (0.045)*** 0.317 (0.040)*** 0.354 (0.057)*** 0.435 (0.061)***  
Team Capability 0.439 (0.049)*** 0.440 (0.049)*** 0.453 (0.045)*** 0.423 (0.057)*** 0.244 (0.062)***  
Involvement  0.165 (0.037)*** 0.162 (0.037)*** 0.165 (0.037)*** 0.124 (0.055)* 0.195 (0.058)***  
Exit 0.269 (0.065)*** 0.281 (0.068)*** 0.287 (0.062)*** 0.272 (0.078)*** 0.313 (0.077)***  
Level-2 
Control Variables 
      
Age  -0.056 (0.123) -0.042 (0.126) 0.006 (0.146) -0.445 (0.280)  
Gender  0.026 (0.084) 0.024 (0.093) 0.112 (0.175) -0.041 (0.127)  
Income  0.013 (0.044) 0.026 (0.059) -0.007 (0.070) 0.031 (0.132)  
Education  -0.089 (0.075) -0.072 (0.076) -0.029 (0.112) -0.022 (0.132)  
Informal Investment  0.044 (0.223) -0.032 (0.208) -0.311 (0.364) 0.771 (0.474)  
Finance Investment  -0.043 (0.114) -0.072 (0.113) -0.076 (0.236) -0.134 (0.131)  
Start-up Experience  0.132 (0.138) 0.098 (0.122)    
China   0.037 (0.188)    
       
Interaction       
China*Source-Friend (H1)    0.275 (0.176)    
China* Return (H2a)   0.024 (0.076)    
China* Risk (H2b)   -0.234 (0.092)*    
China*Relation-Friend (H3a)    0.233 (0.137)+    
China*Relation-Family (H3b)    0.368 (0.166)*    
       
Intercept  2.788 (0.044)*** 2.789 (0.043)*** 2.785 (0.043)*** 2.820 (0.064)*** 2.751 (0.058)***  
Sample  904 904 904 480 424  
R-squared 34.24% 33.57% 47.93% 30.24% 38.06%  
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